Book Description

Many historians give William T. Sherman total credit for the success of the Atlanta Campaign, when in fact it was the success of the Federal team as an institution. Conversely, many blame Joseph Johnston for the Confederate loss in that campaign, when in fact he was only one cog in the Confederate war machine. It was beyond Johnston's ability to adapt if President Jefferson Davis and the rest of the Confederate team failed in fulfilling their duties. More importantly, the Federal team adapted during the middle of the war. In short they were able to transform the way they fought war. The Confederates in the west were never able to do the same. The paradigm of the day was to turn a meeting engagement into a major battle of anywhere from one to three days in length. In a few rare occasions, for example when an enemy retreated into prepared positions, they were cut off and surrounded. If they still refused to surrender then a siege was called for. The Vicksburg Campaign fit this category. Grant maneuvered around the defenses and into the Confederate rear. He then marched toward Vicksburg until he made contact, at Champion Hill, where he fought a major battle. He then invested Vicksburg itself after the Confederates retreated into its defenses. The Atlanta Campaign broke that paradigm. From then on the entire campaign resembled a siege. Now, however, both sides had relatively long Lines of Communication. In other words the battlefield resembled that of today in non-linear non-contiguous warfare. Both sides attempted to raid these LOCs, and both failed to effect the outcome. Had more effort been attempted to break these supply routes the campaign might have looked much different.