U.S. Egyptian Relations After the Cold War


Book Description

Despite several well publicized problems-rising violence from Islamic extremists, an uninspired political climate, and continued unemployment and poverty-Egypt's regime is in no immediate danger of collapse. Rather, the serious problems are long term. If a concerted attempt to address them is not made now, Egypt's future and U.S. interests could be threatened. The workshop focused on four interrelated issues: whether the political system can be revitalized without political upheaval; whether Islamic activism can be moderated or effectively challenged by competing secular forces; whether Egypt's economic reforms can be sustained in the face of the painful political adjustments they will require; and whether the military will continue to play a stabilizing domestic role.




The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956


Book Description

United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War




Democracy Prevention


Book Description

Democracy Prevention explains how America's alliance with Egypt has impeded democratic change and reinforced authoritarianism over time.




Us Democracy Promotion After the Cold War


Book Description

This book explores the often assumed but so far not examined proposition that a particular U.S. culture influences U.S. foreign policy behavior or, more concretely, that widely shared basic assumptions embraced by members of the U.S. administration have a notable impact on foreign policy-making. Publicly professed beliefs regarding America's role in the world and about democracy's universal appeal - despite much contestation - go to the heart of U.S. national identity. Employing extensive foreign policy text analysis as well as using the case study of U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations during the Clinton, Bush junior, and Obama administrations, it shows that basic assumptions matter in U.S. democracy promotion in general, and the book operationalizes them in detail as well as employs qualitative content analysis to assess their validity and variation. The research presented lies at the intersection of International Relations, U.S. foreign policy, regional studies, and democracy promotion. The specific focus on the domestic 'cultural' angle for the study of foreign policy and this dimension's operationalization makes it a creative crossover study and a unique contribution to these overlapping fields.




Foreign Policy as Nation Making


Book Description

A comparison of Turkey's and Egypt's diverging foreign policies during the Cold War in light of their leaderships' nation making projects.




Nasser's Gamble


Book Description

Nasser's Gamble draws on declassified documents from six countries and original material in Arabic, German, Hebrew, and Russian to present a new understanding of Egypt's disastrous five-year intervention in Yemen, which Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser later referred to as "my Vietnam." Jesse Ferris argues that Nasser's attempt to export the Egyptian revolution to Yemen played a decisive role in destabilizing Egypt's relations with the Cold War powers, tarnishing its image in the Arab world, ruining its economy, and driving its rulers to instigate the fatal series of missteps that led to war with Israel in 1967. Viewing the Six Day War as an unintended consequence of the Saudi-Egyptian struggle over Yemen, Ferris demonstrates that the most important Cold War conflict in the Middle East was not the clash between Israel and its neighbors. It was the inter-Arab struggle between monarchies and republics over power and legitimacy. Egypt's defeat in the "Arab Cold War" set the stage for the rise of Saudi Arabia and political Islam. Bold and provocative, Nasser's Gamble brings to life a critical phase in the modern history of the Middle East. Its compelling analysis of Egypt's fall from power in the 1960s offers new insights into the decline of Arab nationalism, exposing the deep historical roots of the Arab Spring of 2011.




Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981


Book Description

Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1955 decision to barter Egyptian cotton for Soviet bloc weaponry thrust Egypt onto center stage in the Cold War in the Middle East. What Egypt needed most, and what the United States was uniquely equipped to provide, was economic aid. For the Egyptian government--eager to take rapid strides toward economic development but crippled by a burgeoning population, a paucity of arable land, and a meager reserve of foreign exchange--American economic aid promised to serve as an enormously important crutch. For American policymakers, economic assistance appeared to be an ideal means of developing American influence in Egypt. Few aid relationships in the last three decades can match the drama and significance of the U.S.-Egyptian experience. This study shows how the American government attempted to use its economic aid program to induce or coerce Egypt to support U.S. interests in the Middle East in the quarter century following the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms agreement. William J. Burns has analyzed recently released government documents and interviews with former policymakers to throw light on the use of aid as a tool of American policy toward the Nasser regime. He also offers valuable observations on the role of the American economic assistance program in the Sadat era.




Lyndon Johnson and the Postwar Order in the Middle East, 1962-1967


Book Description

This book discusses American-Egyptian relations from 1962 to the eve of the Six-Day War in June 1967. The author examines how the decline of diplomacy between the United States and Egypt endangered the Postwar Petroleum Order during the Lyndon B. Johnson years and led to the outbreak of the Six-Day War.




Egyptian Foreign Relations Under al-Sisi


Book Description

Considering both changes and continuities, this book examines how, why, and along which lines Egypt’s external alignments under the al-Sisi regime emerged and developed. Egypt’s foreign relations have changed substantially since the current regime took power in 2013. To assess this, the author develops and applies a unique analytical approach: the model of ‘two-staged alignment formation.’ In the first stage, domestic threats to the Egyptian regime’s survival determined specific needs the regime tried to meet by approaching external partners. In the second stage, characteristics of the global and regional environments defined opportunities and constraints and therefore the regime’s options and logical choices. In sum, the interplay of developments on the domestic, regional, and global levels resulted in a diversification of Egypt’s external alignments, with China and Russia joining the EU and the US as Egypt’s main global partners, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates emerging as the regime’s prime regional partners. Explaining the emerging alignment patterns from 2013 until 2017, this book aids understanding of the complexity of alignment formation and of Egyptian external relations in that critical period of time. This book will be of high interest to researchers and students working on Egyptian foreign relations, on relations between states, and on regional dynamics in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region. It is also valuable for practitioners, because it helps to understand an issue of high relevance for foreign policy-making.




The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War


Book Description

Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt. In addition to assessing Soviet involvement in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War, this book covers the USSR's relations with Syria and Egypt, Soviet aims, U.S. and Israeli perceptions of Soviet involvement, Soviet intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1969-70), and the impact of the conflicts on Soviet-Jewish attitudes. This book as a whole demonstrates how the Soviet Union's actions gave little consideration to the long- or mid-term consequences of their policy, and how firing the first shot compelled them to react to events.