Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries


Book Description

"Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments, pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing, asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing, the price is lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes, not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. This paper, a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network, is part of a larger effort in the network to promote analytical work on emerging policy issues in infrastructure service delivery"-- World Bank web site.







The Impact of Universal Service Obligations and International Cross-Subsidies on the Dispersion of Telephone Services in Developing Countries


Book Description

This paper re-evaluates the telecommunication policies often applied to create regional dispersion of services in developing countries. We observe that failure to consider the complexities of the regional telecommunication systems in creating policies and investment strategies has increased the telecom gap between urban and rural regions worldwide. In particular, the teledensities of rural telecommunications in developing countries have remained very low in spite of support through universal service obligation fees and cross-subsidization from international services. As traditional methods for economic analysis and modeling have failed to identify mechanisms that improve telephone dispersion in these countries, we use a system dynamics modeling approach to deal with complexities of the situation in order to evaluate how Universal Service Obligations (USOs) and International Cross-Subsidy (ICS) policies affect telephone densities. We demonstrate that these policies may be counterproductive due to the structure of the telecom system itself. We also show that, when market-clearing pricing is combined with USOs once the urban telephone density reaches a minimum threshold, the dispersion of rural telecommunications can be considerably improved.




A Market-Based Mechanism for Universal Service Obligations


Book Description

Developing countries often strive to extend basic telecommunications services to rural and remote areas. Wealthier nations sometimes face similar challenges with other services. This paper proposes a novel policy to motivate private-sector operators of basic infrastructure to expand infrastructure into previously unserved regions. It is particularly useful when resources are transferred to the private sector, as occurs during the privatization of a state-owned telecommunications carrier, the introduction of competition, the release of spectrum, or the allocation of cash subsidies for this purpose. Firms receive tradable universal service obligations in the form of milestones that must be met, and commitments to meet specific deadlines. By exchanging its commitments, a firm can increase or decrease the rate at which it must expand infrastructure. By exchanging milestones, a firm can change where it must expand infrastructure. Making milestones and commitments independent and fully tradable allows each firm to develop the most cost effective business strategy possible, and to adapt that strategy as technology and demand evolve over time. The exchange of milestones and commitments does not diminish the obligations that must be met by industry as a whole, insuring the timely expansion of infrastructure. This paper focuses on telecommunications, but the approach is also applicable to other forms of infrastructure, such as electric power and broadcast television.




Reforming the Posts


Book Description

"The monopoly-supported universal service obligation (USO) is usually defended on the grounds that the monopoly allows for cross-subsidy in letter services that in turn allows universal access to a service of great importance to all. The author argues that letter delivery (as opposed to other services that may be provided by post offices) is not in universal demand in poor countries, that the size of the market in developing countries is such that USOs could not be met under the monopoly model, and that the monopoly carries heavy costs for sector development and consumer welfare. He proposes in the place of the postal USO a competitive approach involving universal access to a range of services that poor people have a need to access. Regarding reform of the incumbent, the author takes a preliminary first cut at examining the statistical relationship between postal performance (as measured by letters per capita allowing for income per capita), trust in the postal service, and postal efficiency, and finds a significant link between the three. The results suggest that reforms that improve postal efficiency and trust in the postal network will improve the performance of the postal network. The author suggests that there may be better uses of cross-subsidy from within the sector and government subsidy from without than supporting the inefficient delivery of a service rarely used by poor people. "--World Bank web site.




Liberalisation and Universal Access to Basic Services


Book Description

Access to basic services plays an important role in both individual well-being and a country's economic development. Building on a OECD/World Bank seminar, this volume explores whether and how trade liberalization can contribute to achieving universal service goals and the types of complementary policies required.




Taxing Telecommunications in Developing Countries


Book Description

Developing countries apply numerous sector-specific taxes to telecommunications, whose buoyant revenues and formal enterprises provide a convenient “tax handle”. This paper explores whether there is an economic rationale for sector-specific taxes on telecommunications and, if so, what form they should take to balance the competing goals of promoting connectivity and mobilizing revenues. A survey of the literature finds that limited telecoms competition likely creates rents that could efficiently be taxed. We propose a “pecking order” of sector-specific taxes that could be levied in addition to standard income and value-added taxes, based on capturing rents and minimizing distortions. Taxes that target possible economic rents or profits are preferable, but their administrative challenges may necessitate reliance on service excises at the cost of higher consumer prices and lower connectivity. Taxes on capital inputs and consumer access, which distort production and restrict network access, should be avoided; so should tax incentives, which are not needed to attract foreign capital to tap a local market.




Universal Service in WTO and EU law


Book Description

This book is a systematic comparative study of WTO and EU law relevant for universal service provision, and a timely contribution to the ongoing scholarly and policy debates about the concept and scope of universal service. Universal service is one of the most significant regulatory issues worldwide and it is likely to remain so. The central question dealt with by the author is how the technologically intensive sector of telecommunications services can be regulated in a socially fair way in the light of liberalisation and the immense importance of ICTs in the Information Society. The author investigates whether the legal frameworks of WTO and EU can meet the challenges of the rapid and dramatic technological and social change and formulates relevant policy recommendations. The book is of interest to both scholars and practitioners in several disciplines, such as EU and WTO law, telecommunications law and regulation, political science regarding market regulation and governance as well as European integration and WTO. Olga Batura is affiliated to the Leuphana Law School, University of Lüneburg, Germany, and to the European Humanities University in Vilnius, Lithania.




Reforming the Posts


Book Description

The monopoly-supported universal service obligation (USO) is usually defended on the grounds that the monopoly allows for cross-subsidy in letter services that in turn allows universal access to a service of great importance to all. The author argues that letter delivery (as opposed to other services that may be provided by post offices) is not in universal demand in poor countries, that the size of the market in developing countries is such that USOs could not be met under the monopoly model, and that the monopoly carries heavy costs for sector development and consumer welfare. He proposes in the place of the postal USO a competitive approach involving universal access to a range of services that poor people have a need to access. Regarding reform of the incumbent, the author takes a preliminary first cut at examining the statistical relationship between postal performance (as measured by letters per capita allowing for income per capita), trust in the postal service, and postal efficiency, and finds a significant link between the three. The results suggest that reforms that improve postal efficiency and trust in the postal network will improve the performance of the postal network. The author suggests that there may be better uses of cross-subsidy from within the sector and government subsidy from without than supporting the inefficient delivery of a service rarely used by poor people.