US World War II and Korean War Field Fortifications 1941–53


Book Description

The US Army and Marine Corps in World War II considered themselves highly mobile, offensive forces. Their mobile-warfare doctrine envisioned field fortifications and obstacles as temporary in nature. As a result, their design was simple and made use of local materials, and they could be constructed comparatively quickly, whilst still providing adequate protection. By the time of the Korean War, only minor changes had been made to field fortification construction and layout, and to small-unit organization, weapons, and tactics. This title addresses field fortifications built by US infantrymen during World War II and in Korea, and covers rifle-platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters, observation posts and anti-tank obstacles.




US World War II and Korean War Field Fortifications 1941–53


Book Description

The US Army and Marine Corps in World War II considered themselves highly mobile, offensive forces. Their mobile-warfare doctrine envisioned field fortifications and obstacles as temporary in nature. As a result, their design was simple and made use of local materials, and they could be constructed comparatively quickly, whilst still providing adequate protection. By the time of the Korean War, only minor changes had been made to field fortification construction and layout, and to small-unit organization, weapons, and tactics. This title addresses field fortifications built by US infantrymen during World War II and in Korea, and covers rifle-platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters, observation posts and anti-tank obstacles.




Soviet Field Fortifications 1941–45


Book Description

From June 1941, the Soviets were forced to undertake large-scale defensive operations in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg assault, operations which ran counter to their preference for highly mobile, offensive warfare. Lessons were quickly learned across a wide variety of terrain and climates, including the open steppes, dense forests, wooded swamps, cities, and in snow and ice, where the availability of construction materials differed greatly. The first to cover this topic in the English language and containing detailed information about the trenches, bunkers, observation posts and weapon positions, this book examines field fortifications built from local materials by infantrymen, as well as their use of mines, field camouflage techniques, and construction tools. It provides a first fascinating insight into Russian defensive attempts against the overwhelming might of the German Army.




Soviet Field Fortifications 1941–45


Book Description

From June 1941, the Soviets were forced to undertake large-scale defensive operations in the face of the overwhelming German blitzkrieg assault, operations which ran counter to their preference for highly mobile, offensive warfare. Lessons were quickly learned across a wide variety of terrain and climates, including the open steppes, dense forests, wooded swamps, cities, and in snow and ice, where the availability of construction materials differed greatly. The first to cover this topic in the English language and containing detailed information about the trenches, bunkers, observation posts and weapon positions, this book examines field fortifications built from local materials by infantrymen, as well as their use of mines, field camouflage techniques, and construction tools. It provides a first fascinating insight into Russian defensive attempts against the overwhelming might of the German Army.




German Field Fortifications 1939–45


Book Description

The German Army of World War II considered itself an offensive, mobile force. The experiences in the trenches in World War I had done much to shape its concept of field fortification, and its mobile warfare ethos was intended to prevent the previous war's stalemate. This book addresses frontline defensive field fortifications, built by infantrymen using local materials, and includes rifle platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters and more. It also covers anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as field camouflage methods and construction methods. The integration of these positions into permanent systems and theatre-specific defences are also discussed.




German Field Fortifications 1939–45


Book Description

The German Army of World War II considered itself an offensive, mobile force. The experiences in the trenches in World War I had done much to shape its concept of field fortification, and its mobile warfare ethos was intended to prevent the previous war's stalemate. This book addresses frontline defensive field fortifications, built by infantrymen using local materials, and includes rifle platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters and more. It also covers anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, as well as field camouflage methods and construction methods. The integration of these positions into permanent systems and theatre-specific defences are also discussed.




Fortifications and Siegecraft


Book Description

As centers for defense and bases for attack since ancient times, fortifications are a crucial aspect of military history. Indeed, as Jeremy Black shows, the history of fortifications is a global history of humanity itself. Moreover, their remains offer a still potent, often dramatic testimony to the past, notably through the strength of the sites, the power of the works, and the vast resources they required. This compelling book explores not only the history of fortifications themselves, but also the real and potential threat to them posed by siegecraft. Tracing the interaction of attack and defense over time, Black situates the evolution of fortifications within the wider development of governments, societies, and cultures. Moreover, his examination of the future of these installations, as well as of potential methods of destroying them, only reaffirms their omnipresence in human history—and their continued importance. Fortifications are not simply relics of the past, but rather elements fundamental to military and social interaction across the world today.




American Civil War Fortifications (1)


Book Description

The 50 years before the American Civil War saw a boom in the construction of coastal forts in the United States of America. These stone and brick forts stretched from New England to the Florida Keys, and as far as the Mississippi River. At the start of the war some were located in the secessionist states, and many fell into Confederate hands. Although a handful of key sites stayed in Union hands throughout the war, the remainder had to be won back through bombardment or assault. This book examines the design, construction and operational history of those fortifications, such as Fort Sumter, Fort Morgan and Fort Pulaski, which played a crucial part in the course of the Civil War.




Bastions and Barbed Wire


Book Description

Various papers on the archaeology of conflict, including battlefield archaeology. The main focus of the volume is confinement, as expressed by a wide variety of contexts. Most obviously these include Nazi concentration camps, which are in need of credible archaeological attention (the editorial points out the dangers of the misappropriation of archaeological and scientific techniques by Holocaust deniers). Other forms of confinement are examined in papers focussing on the archaeology of island defences and siege sites, with the sieges of Leith from 1650 and of Fort William from 1646 both recently being subject to archaeological investigation. Other contributions include a study of shell holes and field defences from the battle of the Bulge (1944).




Israeli Fortifications of the October War 1973


Book Description

The Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal was born out of the overwhelming victory of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the Six Day War of 1967. Devastated by their defeat, the Egyptian army bombarded Israeli positions, causing many casualties. Accordingly, the IDF Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, ordered the construction of a series of fortified positions named the Bar Lev Line. Each position was surrounded by barbed wire and minefields and virtually immune to strikes by artillery shells and even 500kg bombs. On 6 October 1973, Yom Kippur, the positions were manned by just 436 reservists when the Egyptian Second and Third Armies launched a massive offensive along the Suez Canal. The positions were quickly cut off from the supporting elements, and the Israeli defenders paid a high price with a casualty rate of almost 50 per cent. Despite these losses, it was not the Bar Lev Line that failed but Israel's military and political establishment, which realised Arab intentions too late.