Illustrative Effects of Voluntary Debt and Debt Service Reduction Operations


Book Description

This paper discusses the potential effects of voluntary debt and debt service reduction operations supported by multilateral agencies and governments of creditor countries. The paper considers alternative financial structures for these operations : buy-backs, par and discounted debt exchanges and concessional debt restructurings. The note concludes that for relatively small market based operations, the overall benefits to the country under those alternative structures are likely to be very similar. Tax and regulatory benefits as well as the possibility of creating some degree of seniority for exit bonds, could enhance the benefits obtained through debt exchanges relative to buy-backs. Concessional loan restructurings are the most difficult to evaluate, because the outcome hinges on the determinants of the bargaining strength of each side, as well as on the economics of debt reduction.







Voluntary Debt Reduction


Book Description

In an economy with a debt overhang, investment depends on expected tax rates. On the other hand, expected tax rates depend on the debt’s face value. Therefore investment depends on the face value of debt. I show that this may lead to a positive or negative association between debt and investment depending on the degree of international capital mobility and attitudes toward risk. There may also exist multiple equilibria; with high and low investment levels. The paper explores the desirability of debt reduction in this environment. First, it characterizes circumstances in which debt reduction is desirable from the collective point of view of the creditors. Second, it formulates the forgiveness decision as a noncooperative game among creditors and explores the scope for debt reduction as an outcome of this game.







Voluntary Debt Reduction


Book Description

In an economy with a debt overhang, investment depends on expected tax rates. On the other hand, expected tax rates depend on the debt's face value. Therefore investment depends on the face value of debt. I show that this may lead to a positive or negative association between debt and investment depending on the degree of international capital mobility and attitudes toward risk. There may also exist multiple equilibria; with high and low investment levels. The paper explores the desirability of debt reduction in this environment. First, it characterizes circumstances in which debt reduction is desirable from the collective point of view of the creditors. Second, it formulates the forgiveness decision as a noncooperative game among creditors and explores the scope for debt reduction as an outcome of this game.










Sovereign Debt Relief Schemes and Welfare


Book Description

This paper shows that concerted debt reduction may be welfare-improving even when the investment disincentive effect of a debt overhang is not large enough to place the debtor country on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve. Whether the appropriate relief scheme involves debt reduction or new money, however, depends on whether investment disincentives or liquidity constraints dominate. It is shown that, except under very special circumstances, mixed policy packages involving both debt and liquidity relief may not yield the desired results.




Analytical Issues in Debt


Book Description

This book, edited by Jacob A. Frenkel, Michael P. Dooley, and Peter Wickham, presents a sample of the work of the IMF and that of world-renowned scholars on the analytical issues surrounding the explosion of countries with debt-servicing difficulties and describes debt initiatives and debt-reduction techniques that hold the best promise for finding a lasting solution to the problems of debtor countries.