Independent Review of U. S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and O


Book Description

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.




Independent Review of U. S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk


Book Description

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment. Squire, Michael D. Langley Research Center PROBABILITY THEORY; RISK ASSESSMENT; SPACE DEBRIS; INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION; MICROMETEOROIDS; RISK; SOVIET SPACECRAFT; AEROSPACE SAFETY; CATASTROPHE THEORY







Technical Evaluation of the NASA Model for Cancer Risk to Astronauts Due to Space Radiation


Book Description

NASA's current missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and potential future exploration missions involving extended stays by astronauts on the lunar surface, as well as the possibility of near- Earth object (NEO) or Mars missions, present challenges in protecting astronauts from radiation risks. These risks arise from a number of sources, including solar particle events (SPEs), galactic cosmic rays (GCRs), secondary radiation from surface impacts, and even the nuclear isotope power sources transported with the astronauts. The serious early and late radiation health effects potentially posed by these exposures are equally varied, ranging from early signs of radiation sickness to cancer induction. Other possible effects include central nervous system damage, cataracts, cardiovascular damage, heritable effects, impaired wound healing, and infertility. Recent research, much of which has been sponsored by NASA, has focused on understanding and quantifying the radiation health risks posed by space radiation environments. Although many aspects of the space radiation environments are now relatively well characterized, important uncertainties still exist regarding biological effects and thus regarding the level and types of risks faced by astronauts. This report presents an evaluation of NASA's proposed space radiation cancer risk assessment model, which is described in the 2011 NASA report, Space Radiation Cancer Risk Projections and Uncertainties-2010. The evaluation in Technical Evaluation of the NASA Model for Cancer Risk to Astronauts Due to Space Radiation considers the model components, input data (for the radiation types, estimated doses, and epidemiology), and the associated uncertainties. This report also identifies gaps in NASA's current research strategy for reducing the uncertainties in cancer induction risks.







Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners


Book Description

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS). NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition.as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. During the past several decades, much has been written on PRA methods and applications. Several university and practitioner textbooks and sourcebooks currently exist, but they focus on applications of PRA to industries other than aerospace. Although some of the techniques used in PRA originated in work for aerospace and military applications, no comprehensive reference currently exists for PRA applications to aerospace systems. This PRA Procedures Guide, in the present second edition, is neither a textbook nor an exhaustive sourcebook of PRA methods and techniques. It provides a set of recommended procedures, based on the experience of the authors, that are applicable to different levels and types of PRA that are performed for aerospace applications. It therefore serves two purposes, to: 1. Complement the training material taught in the NASA PRA course for practitioners, and together with the Fault Tree Handbook, the Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook, the Bayesian Inference handbook, the Risk Management Handbook, and the System Safety Handbook to provide quantitative risk methodology documentation, and to provide aerospace PRA practitioners in selecting an analysis approach that is best suited for their applications.




Fractal Risk Assessment of ISS Propulsion Module in Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Environments


Book Description

A unique and innovative risk assessment of the International Space Station (ISS) Propulsion Module is conducted using fractal modeling of the Module's response to the meteoroid and orbital debris environments. Both the environment models and structural failure modes due to the resultant hypervelocity impact phenomenology, as well as Module geometry, are investigated for fractal applicability. The fractal risk assessment methodology could produce a greatly simplified alternative to current methodologies, such as BUMPER analyses, while maintaining or increasing the number of complex scenarios that can be assessed. As a minimum, this innovative fractal approach will provide an independent assessment of existing methodologies in a unique way.Mog, Robert A.Marshall Space Flight CenterRISK; METEOROIDS; FRACTALS; INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION; STRUCTURAL FAILURE; SPACE DEBRIS; ASSESSMENTS; FAILURE MODES; ENVIRONMENT MODELS; HYPERVELOCITY IMPACT; PHENOMENOLOGY




Space Radiation Hazards and the Vision for Space Exploration


Book Description

Fulfilling the President's Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) will require overcoming many challenges. Among these are the hazards of space radiation to crews traveling to the Moon and Mars. To explore these challenges in some depth and to examine ways to marshal research efforts to address them, NASA, NSF, and the NRC sponsored a workshop bringing together members of the space and planetary science, radiation physics, operations, and exploration engineering communities. The goals of the workshop were to increase understanding of the solar and space physics in the environment of Earth, the Moon, and Mars; to identify compelling relevant research goals; and discuss directions this research should take over the coming decade. This workshop report presents a discussion of radiation risks for the VSE, an assessment of specifying and predicting the space radiation environment, an analysis of operational strategies for space weather support, and a summary and conclusions of the workshop.




Radiation and the International Space Station


Book Description

A major objective of the International Space Station is learning how to cope with the inherent risks of human spaceflightâ€"how to live and work in space for extended periods. The construction of the station itself provides the first opportunity for doing so. Prominent among the challenges associated with ISS construction is the large amount of time that astronauts will be spending doing extravehicular activity (EVA), or "space walks." EVAs from the space shuttle have been extraordinarily successful, most notably the on-orbit repair of the Hubble Space Telescope. But the number of hours of EVA for ISS construction exceeds that of the Hubble repair mission by orders of magnitude. Furthermore, the ISS orbit has nearly twice the inclination to Earth's equator as Hubble's orbit, so it spends part of every 90-minute circumnavigation at high latitudes, where Earth's magnetic field is less effective at shielding impinging radiation. This means that astronauts sweeping through these regions will be considerably more vulnerable to dangerous doses of energetic particles from a sudden solar eruption. Radiation and the International Space Station estimates that the likelihood of having a potentially dangerous solar event during an EVA is indeed very high. This report recommends steps that can be taken immediately, and over the next several years, to provide adequate warning so that the astronauts can be directed to take protective cover inside the ISS or shuttle. The near-term actions include programmatic and operational ways to take advantage of the multiagency assets that currently monitor and forecast space weather, and ways to improve the in situ measurements and the predictive power of current models.




Report by the International Space Station (Iss) Management and Cost Evaluation (Imce) Task Force


Book Description

The International Space Station (ISS) Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force (IMCE) was chartered to conduct an independent external review and assessment of the ISS cost, budget, and management. In addition, the Task Force was asked to provide recommendations that could provide maximum benefit to the U.S. taxpayers and the International Partners within the President's budget request. The Task Force has made the following principal findings: (1) The ISS Program's technical achievements to date, as represented by on-orbit capability, are extraordinary; (2) The Existing ISS Program Plan for executing the FY 02-06 budget is not credible; (3) The existing deficiencies in management structure, institutional culture, cost estimating, and program control must be acknowledged and corrected for the Program to move forward in a credible fashion; (4) Additional budget flexibility, from within the Office of Space Flight (OSF) must be provided for a credible core complete program; (5) The research support program is proceeding assuming the budget that was in place before the FY02 budget runout reduction of $1B; (6) There are opportunities to maximize research on the core station program with modest cost impact; (7) The U.S. Core Complete configuration (three person crew) as an end-state will not achieve the unique research potential of the ISS; (8) The cost estimates for the U.S.-funded enhancement options (e.g., permanent seven person crew) are not sufficiently developed to assess credibility. After these findings, the Task Force has formulated several primary recommendations which are published here and include: (1) Major changes must be made in how the ISS program is managed; (2) Additional cost reductions are required within the baseline program; (3) Additional funds must be identified and applied from the Human Space Flight budget; (4) A clearly defined program with a credible end-state, agreed to by all stakeholders, must be developed and implemented.Young, A. Thomas an