The "Prisoners' Dilemma" as a contribution of game theory for a better understanding of social conflicts and the value of commons


Book Description

Essay from the year 2014 in the subject Philosophy - Theoretical (Realisation, Science, Logic, Language), grade: 1, Ruhr-University of Bochum (Institut für Fremdsprachen - Englisch), course: C1 Englisch, language: English, abstract: The paper gives a detailed lecture on the prisoner's dilemma and emphasizes its application with regard to the development of common goods and values in social life. Whenever we make a rational choice which might inflict a loss or impose a risk on others we enter the world of morality. Trying to solve the conflict rationally between opposite moral positions we might find ourself in a "social dilemma". Such dilemma was basically modeled first in 1950 as the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" by canadian mathematician Albert Tucker and has been modified and developed since then in many ways, for instance by the nobel price winner Amartya Sen. Still today the basic model points out the permanent underlying conflict in our rationality respectively interest whenever it refers to the life of others, to the social life. At a first glance the underlying story of the Prisoners' Dilemma "game" seems quite simple. Two criminals are held separately in prison being accused having committed one severe crime (let us say bank robbery) and another less severe crime (let us say fast driving). The judge talks to each of them separately in a way like this: "If you confess the severe crime and your complice does not than he will get the maximum penelty of 10 years in prison and you will be free, and vice versa. But if you both confess the severe crime then your confessions are not worth much so you will get the second highest penalty of 5 years. If you both don't confess but deny you both will get the third highest punishment of 3 years due to the undeniable less severe crime." There is no communication possible between the two prisoners.




Game Theory and the Law


Book Description

This book is the first to apply the tools of game theory and information economics to advance our understanding of how laws work. Organized around the major solution concepts of game theory, it shows how such well known games as the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes, beer-quiche, and the Rubinstein bargaining game can illuminate many different kinds of legal problems. Game Theory and the Law highlights the basic mechanisms at work and lays out a natural progression in the sophistication of the game concepts and legal problems considered.




The Evolution of Cooperation


Book Description

A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.




Prisoner's Dilemma


Book Description

An account of many experiments in which the psychological game Prisoner's Dilemma was played




The Prisoner's Dilemma


Book Description

This volume examines the Prisoner's Dilemma, exploring its continued significance and ramifications in varying fields of study.




Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?


Book Description

In this book, David K. Levine questions the idea that behavioral economics is the answer to economic problems. He explores the successes and failures of contemporary economics both inside and outside the laboratory, and asks whether popular behavioral theories of psychological biases are solutions to the failures. The book not only provides an overview of popular behavioral theories and their history, but also gives the reader the tools for scrutinizing them.




Social Dilemmas


Book Description

Emphasizing real-world examples, Komorita and Parks illustrate both the theoretical and the ecological relevance of social dilemmas, focusing on "exchange theory" to explain how conflicts are resolved. This book is appropriate for students of psychology, political science, and sociology.




Artificial Morality


Book Description

Explores the role of artificial intelligence in the development of a claim that morality is person made and rational.This book explores the role of artificial intelligence in the development of a claim that morality is person-made and rational. Professor Danielson builds moral robots that do better than amoral competitors in a tournament of games like the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken. The book thus engages in current controversies over the adequacy of the received theory of rational choice. It sides with Gauthier and McClennan, who extend the devices of rational choice to include moral constraint. Artificial Morality goes further, by promoting communication, testing and copying of principles and by stressing empirical tests.




Game Theory


Book Description

The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students




Game Theory, Alive


Book Description

We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.