The Economics of Charity


Book Description

Label mounted on title page: Transatlantic Arts, Inc., Levittown, N.Y., sole distributor for the U.S.A. Includes bibliographical references.




Three Essays on the Economics of Image Motivation


Book Description

This thesis contains two essays that assess the role of social image concerns in charitable giving decisions and one essay that explores the role of authority in hierarchical relationships characterized by aligned monetary interests.The first essay uses a neuro-economic experiment to compare the effect of social exposure on two types of pro-social behaviors: doing good and avoiding doing bad. We find that image gains deriving from visible acts of generosity are computed by the brain as rewards for both decisions. Differently, selfish decisions with no negative image consequences are computed differently: not doing good (and thus saving money) correlates with reward-related regions, while doing bad (and thus earning money) correlates with regions related to punishment's anticipation and moral disgust.The second essay studies how information about real charities' efficiency (and its social visibility) affects small donors contributions. We find that individuals disregard bad news about their own charities when giving happens under full anonymity, but do increase their contributions to charities that perform better than expected. Differently, when both the amount donated and the efficiency of the recipient are public knowledge, donors motivated by social image concerns treat the quantity and the quality of their donations as substitutes.The third investigates the effects of control in principal-agents' relationships where monetary interests are aligned. By comparing direct control and general impersonal rules, we show that direct monitoring generates significantly more hidden costs of control from the agent side than impersonal rules.At the same time however, principals tend to exercise their authority less when restrictions are impersonal, as these force them to signal their greed also when unnecessary.
















Essays on Charitable Activity


Book Description

This dissertation consists of three separate essays on various types of charitable activity. Each chapter examines incentives for charitable giving, including how charity religious affiliation impacts donations, how donors and charities respond to mandatory unrelated business income tax return disclosure, and the long-run impact of heterogeneous mission educational aid. These works advance the field by examining the motivations of altruistic behavior in terms of charity affiliations, how donors and charitable organizations respond to mandatory disclosure requirements, and the long-run impact of development aid affiliated with a religious group. In chapter one, I explore donor preferences for charity religious affiliation. In the United States, most charitable donations go to religiously affiliated organizations, yet the impact of a charity's affiliation on donor behavior is currently unclear. To better understand this impact, I use a laboratory experiment to explore how a charity's religious affiliation drives donor behavior. In doing so, I contribute to the understanding of how charity affiliations impact donor decisions. In the experiment, subjects select one charity from a list of eight, with each charity varying in religious affiliation. Masked and unmasked sessions differ in the inclusion of religious affiliation from half the charities, with masked sessions omitting religious affiliation of the charities. I find that adding religious language decreases donation frequency for Christian charities competing against other religious charities. Furthermore, adding religious language increases the average donation size for secular charities competing against Christian charities but decreases average donations for Christian charities competing against other religious charities. Subjects prefer charity religious affiliation to match their own religious identity; however, subject strength of religiosity is more predictive in charity choice than religious affiliation. Next, chapter two examines how charities and donors respond to mandatory disclosure. Financial disclosure requirements are common accountability measures placed on publicly funded organizations. However, the impact of financial disclosure requirements on organizational structure or on financial contributors' behavior is not well understood in the context of non-profit organizations. I explore this question by analyzing mandatory Form 990-T disclosure included in the Pension Protection Act. This contributes to the understanding of organizational and financial contributor response to mandatory disclosure in an environment already requiring operation data disclosure. I use a difference-in-differences approach, comparing organizations filing a Form 990-T at least once in the three years prior to passage to those who did not. I find that one in four filing organizations create a subsidiary in the following two filing years. Subsidiary tax filings are not subject to disclosure, indicating that non-profits can restructure their organizations in a manner allowing them to circumvent disclosure requirements. While charities alter their organizational structure, I find no evidence of net changes in donor behavior towards charities, as aggregate total contributions and government grants received do not change. Finally, chapter three examines the long-run impacts of religious-based development charities on economic and cultural outcomes. I explore this question by using the differences in education aid by Presbyterian and Methodist missions in 20th century Korea, where Presbyterian missions established 85% of all mission schools and required conversion for attendance. Using variation in an agreement defining boundaries on Presbyterian and Methodist mission operations, I find no differences in educational attainment, household income, or Protestant affiliation across comity agreement borders when looking at the South Korean Population. However, among South Korean Protestants, I find that Protestants living in historically Presbyterian areas earn approximately 300,000 won a month more than Protestant households on the Methodist side of the comity agreement border. The difference in income is not caused by differing levels of education, as I find no difference in Protestant educational attainment across the comity agreement border in either age groups born before compulsory education or those born afterward.




The Economics of Individual Philanthropy


Book Description

This dissertation investigates the market of individual philanthropy through two essays on religiosity and charitable giving by married couples. The second chapter examines whether people who engage in religious activities are more generous in terms of both religious and secular giving and whether gender differences exist in charitable giving within different levels of religiosity. The results of bivariate probit and tobit analyses show that religious people have a greater propensity to give and higher levels of giving to both religious and secular charitable organizations. A zero-inflated ordered probit model is used to analyze an individual donor's decision-making process, and the results reveal that gender-based distinctions differ between religious and less-religious individuals in both magnitude and sign, although no gender difference is found for the whole sample. Since little research exists on the bargaining power of married couples over giving to charities, using newly available panel data on U.S. households from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, the third chapter investigates the question of who has relatively greater bargaining power when the husband and the wife make charitable giving decisions together. Results suggest that the husband, on average, has significantly greater bargaining power than the wife, and bargaining over charitable giving reduces household giving by 8 percent. Moreover, the joint decision made by a family with traditional views on gender roles tends to have the husband with even more bargaining power.