History of United States Naval Operations


Book Description

Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.




U.S. Naval Forces' Capabilities for Responding to Small Vessel Threats


Book Description

At the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council appointed an expert committee to examine U.S. Naval Forces' capabilities for responding to the potential exploitation of small vessels by adversaries. The Department of the Navy determined that the report prepared by the committee is classified in its entirety under Executive Order 13526 and therefore cannot be made available to the public. This abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.




US Naval Strategy and National Security


Book Description

This book examines US naval strategy and the role of American seapower over three decades, from the late 20th century to the early 21st century. This study uses the concept of seapower as a framework to explain the military and political application of sea power and naval force for the United States of America. It addresses the context in which strategy, and in particular US naval strategy and naval power, evolves and how US naval strategy was developed and framed in the international and national security contexts. It explains what drove and what constrained US naval strategy and examines selected instances where American sea power was directed in support of US defense and security policy ends – and whether that could be tied to what a given strategy proposed. The work utilizes naval capstone documents in the framework of broader maritime conceptual and geopolitical thinking, and discusses whether these documents had lasting influences in the strategic mind-set, the force structure, and other areas of American sea power. Overall, this work provides a deeper understanding of the crafting of US naval strategy since the final decade of the Cold War, its contextual and structural framework setting, and its application. To that end, the work bridges the gap between the thinking of American naval officers and planners on the one hand and academic analyses of Navy strategy on the other hand. It also presents the trends in the use of naval force for foreign policy objectives and into strategy-making in the American policy context. This book will be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime strategy, US national security and international relations in general.










The U.S. Navy


Book Description

Great power competition has returned to the world stage and the U.S. Navy finds itself in the forefront of U.S. efforts to demonstrate national resolve. The U.S. Navy: Case Studies in its Past, Present, and Future argues that the challenge of determining the future structure and operation of the fleet can be best achieved through an examination of its relevant past experience, as well as from current operations of the navy. After years of uncertainty as to its purpose and missions, the rise of China and Russian provocations now require U.S. officials to transform the fleet and its way of employing it. The contributors to this edition provide case studies of past, present, and future challenges that the U.S. Navy has, and will need to overcome as it reconsiders how it will restructure the fleet and reconsider its prevailing concepts of operations. Contributors examine past challenges to structuring the fleet and its prevailing concepts of operation. Based on this foundation, case studies propose how navy leadership should consider developing and employing the fleet in future. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Defense & Security Analysis.







Anchor of Resolve


Book Description

Chronology -- Growing American interests -- Establishment of the Middle East Force -- Creation of Central Command and NAVCENT -- The tanker war -- Desert Shield and Desert Storm -- Enforcing the peace -- Establishment of Fifth Fleet and evolution of NSA Bahrain -- Humanitarian operations -- Engaging America's allies -- Containing Iraq -- Maritime interception operations -- A new threat emerges -- Operation Enduring Freedom -- Operation Iraqi Freedom -- Global war on terrorism -- Acronym glossary.




U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century


Book Description

This nation‘s Cold War and Global War on Terror defense structures need an update. U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century provides such a framework for the changed world we live in, offering a detailed roadmap that shows how the United States can field a war-winning fleet that can also compete aggressively in peacetime against dangerous competitors unlike any the nation has faced before. Brent Sadler presents a compelling new strategy and organizing approach that he calls naval statecraft, which acknowledges the centrality and importance of the maritime domain. While similar in scale and scope to Cold War containment strategies against the Soviets, naval statecraft is much more. It must be to challenge China‘s involvement in global supply chains, which gives that country significant financial heft and influence around the world. Unlike what existed during of the Cold War, however, Sadler provides a unique vision for competing with China and Russia. Rather than simply calling for better coordinated U.S. diplomacy, military operations, and economic statecraft, Sadler argues for integrating the levers of national power coherently and in a sustainable way. This is no small feat, and his approach is informed by a long career rich in working with various agencies of government, foreign militaries (including hostile ones), and our allies. It is an approach imminently appropriate to our times but comes with a realization that the nation is not ready for the competition it faces from China and Russia. The book is a valuable contribution to the national debate over how best to respond to China‘s rise and Russia‘s antagonisms.




Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces


Book Description

A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surprise—both operationally and technically related—facing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.